Subduing the Digital Dragon: Controlling the Internet in Asia by Kawamoto, Kevin
Pacific University
CommonKnowledge
Volume 2 (2002) Interface: The Journal of Education, Communityand Values
7-1-2002
Subduing the Digital Dragon: Controlling the
Internet in Asia
Kevin Kawamoto
University of Washington
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.pacificu.edu/inter02
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Interface: The Journal of Education, Community and Values at CommonKnowledge. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Volume 2 (2002) by an authorized administrator of CommonKnowledge. For more information, please contact
CommonKnowledge@pacificu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kawamoto, K. (2002). Subduing the Digital Dragon: Controlling the Internet in Asia. Interface: The Journal of Education, Community
and Values 2(6). Available http://bcis.pacificu.edu/journal/2002/06/kawamoto.php
Subduing the Digital Dragon: Controlling the Internet in Asia
Rights
Terms of use for work posted in CommonKnowledge.
This article is available at CommonKnowledge: http://commons.pacificu.edu/inter02/41
6/23/2014 Subduing the Digital Dragon: Controlling the Internet in Asia | Interface
http://bcis.pacificu.edu/interface/?p=2576 1/25
Subduing the Digital Dragon: Controlling
the Internet in Asia
Posted on July 1, 2002 by Editor
By Kevin Kawamoto <kawamoto@u.washington.edu>
INDEX:
Abstract
.01 Censorship in the West
.02 Rogues and Rebels
.03 Primer: What is Asia?
.04 Mass Media in Asia
.05 News and Information in Asia
.06 Critical Incidents that Challenge Existing Media Control Structures
Singapore
Vietnam
.07 The Future Mass Media Landscape in Asia
Endnotes
Bibliography
6/23/2014 Subduing the Digital Dragon: Controlling the Internet in Asia | Interface
http://bcis.pacificu.edu/interface/?p=2576 2/25
ABSTRACT (return to index)
Governments and political leaders have tried to control the production and dissemination of news
and information for hundreds of years. Even before Gutenberg’s invention of the printing press in
1455, the Catholic Church, which was also the dominant political force in medieval Europe,
strictly controlled access to information through its oversight of manuscript and book
reproduction. After printing was mechanized, political and religious leaders in a number of
countries issued lists of forbidden books and required printing operators to apply for licenses from
the government before practicing their trade. In this way, the government could keep close tabs
on the owners and operators of print technology and impose sanctions for real and perceived
transgressions. This paper is about media control in several Asian countries with restrictive media
environments. The analogies that can be drawn between sixteenth century England and the
current situation in Singapore, China and Vietnam are quite remarkable. This paper attempts to
discuss the phenomenon of media control as it relates to emerging new technologies in parts of
Asia where governments do not embrace the Western liberal perspective of press freedom. It will
attempt to answer, among other things, the question of how some Asian countries are
responding to the quandaries presented by a global communications network.
.01 Censorship in the West (return to index)
News and information are inherently political because they have the potential to affect the way
people think, feel and behave. Media exposés of corruption in government, for example, have
resulted in significant shifts in public opinion and, in the case of Watergate, have even brought
down an American president. Because of the potential power of mass communication, political
leaders throughout history have struggled to control or contain the flow of news and information
in their domain, especially when they believe that the content is socially, politically or economically
disruptive. Kings, queens, popes, prime ministers, generals, presidents and their official
representatives have gone to great lengths to make sure that dissenting voices were silenced
and that those who helped disseminate views unfavorable to the ruling class were punished.
Such attempts to control news and information long pre-date the printing press (mid-fifteenth
century). Ostensibly to stamp out heresy, the Catholic Church tightly controlled the reproduction
of books and manuscripts for centuries and restricted access to them to a relatively small group
of clerics and scholars. In ancient times, some of the earliest libraries were constructed adjacent
to or within temples and castles, presumably to link, both physically and metaphorically, the dual
powers of government and knowledge.
During the first part of the sixteenth century, when mechanical printing was well underway,
England’s King Henry VIII imposed various forms of media control (e.g., an index of prohibited
books, printer’s licenses, prior restraint , etc.) on both the consumers and producers of news
and information in an attempt to keep troublesome ideas from spreading through the relatively
new technology of mechanical printing. More than any specific form of government-imposed
restriction, however, the culture of self-censorship was (and continues to be) a powerful regulator
of controversial speech, even in societies that profess to be democratic. In any repressive media
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environment, there is a certain level of complicity among journalists and editors to avoid or tread
gingerly around subjects that are politically contentious. Sometimes this caution is a practical if
not reluctant act of survival; other times it is the result of socialization to (and acceptance of) an
ideology that views the role of the journalist from a less liberal perspective.
.02 Rogues and Rebels (return to index)
Almost as long as there have been attempts to censor news and information, there also have
been those who, sometimes at great personal and professional risk, have broken the rules.
Printers have always found ways to circumvent censorship laws, and consumers, if they want
something bad enough, will usually find ways to get it. In sixteenth century England, despite
harsh printing laws, books were routinely published without official sanction both inside and
outside of the country. Because printed books were becoming popular among the emerging
middle class, those willing to risk punishment, fines or jail time (or worse) could make
considerable sums of money in the illicit book trade. The American Colonial press had its share of
rogues and rule breakers – including Benjamin Harris, James Franklin (older brother of Ben), and
John Peter Zenger – all of whom challenged government authority in some form in their
newspapers and helped plant the roots for a free press in what was to become the United
States of America. A number of other newspapers, pamphlets, and other printed material were
published without official approval and circulated among members of the public, triggering
discourse and deliberation in the fledgling colonies. These publications often addressed issues
that irritated Crown-appointed administrators, and they were censored when possible, but over
time, governments with repressive mass media laws have usually found that they were
ineffectual in trying to curb free speech. Rebellion and enlightenment helped liberalize the media
environment in the West, paving the way for a “Liberal Normative” perspective (defined below)
that opposes censorship and endorses freedom of speech.
.03 Primer: What is Asia? (return to index)
The broad subject of this paper is the mass media climate in Asia, but it is first necessary to
stipulate that the many of the media systems in Asia are as different from each other as the
countries in which they exist. The region that constitutes Asia is extraordinarily diverse; hence to
use the word “Asian” as an adjective always invites the potential for gross overgeneralization.
Asia is typically divided by scholars into at least four, sometimes more, sub-regions: East Asia,
Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia. These designations reflect a Western European
point of view, the countries of East Asia being farthest to the east of Western Europe. Other
terms used to classify this region are Far East, Middle East, and Near East. Regardless of
classifications, the Asian region as commonly understood usually extends from the northernmost
point of the Japanese peninsula, and then down south to the islands of Indonesia, and then west
including everything south of Russia (but not anything on the African continent). The precise
dividing line on this western end is nebulous but generally includes the former Soviet republics and
the countries normally considered to be Middle Eastern states.
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Of interest in this paper is the sub-region known as East Asia and Southeast Asia. Simply to list
these countries by name without comment would be problematic. In East Asia, there is definitely
China, Japan, North Korea, and South Korea. China does not consider Taiwan to be a legitimate
autonomous nation-state, but it is widely regarded as one by the rest of the world, if not officially
then at least unofficially. Hong Kong seems like its own nation-state but politically has been a part
of China (called a Special Administrative Region of China) since July 1, 1997. Macao is also an
SAR of China after having been a Portuguese colony for 442 years until December 20, 1999. In
Southeast Asia there is Brunei, Myanmar (or Burma), Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. East Timor achieved independence on May 20,
2002 after a long and sometimes violent struggle with Indonesia. Tibet is an area that has long
sought independence and autonomy — thus far unsuccessfully — from China. Hong Kong,
Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan have been referred to as “The Four Tigers” because their
newly industrialized economies (NIEs) propelled them to rapid economic development in recent
decades. Many nations in Asia have complex political histories because of colonization, war,
ethnic conflict, poverty, religious struggle, and multiple forms of government.
These two sub-regions of Asia — East Asia and Southeast Asia — include countries that have
different languages, cultures, histories, political systems, and so forth. They should not be
mistaken for homogenous entities. Media systems within a country can also be diverse, with a
mixture of private and state-owned entities in some cases.
.04 Mass Media in Asia (return to index)
In the U.S., much of the study of mass media focuses on developments in North America and
Western Europe. This paper examines, in a necessarily limited way because of time and space,
the politics of news and information in parts of Asia. While it would be impossible to do a
comprehensive study of Asian mass media systems in a paper of this size, it is possible to look at
a number of critical incidents and developments in selected Asian nations that have challenged
the status quo where mass media and communication regulation are concerned.
A country’s mass media system is a reflection of its political system. When a political system
changes, the mass media system often changes with it. Likewise, the mass media can influence
or help drive change in the political system. The mass media of the Philippines, for example,
changed considerably after Ferdinand Marcos, who had declared martial law for more than a
decade, was deposed as president in 1986. “Since the fall of the Marcos regime,” wrote Vanden
Heuvel and Dennis (1993), “the Philippine media have operated in an entirely new context — one
in which the press enjoys more freedom than in any Asian country, except perhaps Japan” (p.
95).
Changes in government in other countries have had liberalizing effects on the media system.
Radical political reforms in Taiwan and South Korea in the late 1980s, for example, relaxed those
countries’ hitherto restrictive media systems. The Thai print media are known to be candid and
rambunctious. In May 1992, when the military fired on pro-democracy demonstrators in the
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streets of Bangkok, killing and injuring dozens, newspapers there violated government orders and
reported the violence promptly. Photographs and courageous reporting of this incident helped
turn public opinion against the already unpopular military government. A new government was
eventually installed, and the Thai newspapers helped usher in greater press freedoms as they
doggedly pointed out the need for democratic reforms.
These examples should not suggest that the process leading to a more liberalized media system
is linear and absolutely progressive. It is not. In all of the countries mentioned, there have been
setbacks and contradictions where press freedom is concerned. The tension between
government and the news media exists in all countries, and at some points in history those
tensions result in a more restrictive media environment. In both Thailand and the Philippines, for
example, different political leaders over the years have attempted to rein in the press when it felt
the reporting was cutting too close to the bone. The test of press freedom is whether those
attempts are effective and long-lasting. In those countries where a more liberal media
environment have taken hold, the collective impetus to maintain a low level of press control
perseveres despite setbacks.
Communication technologies such as the Internet and satellites may have the modern-day
impact on Asian societies that the printing press had on European societies in the late-fifteenth
century and beyond. They can help disseminate revolutionary ideas about society and justice as
well as galvanize disparate groups in society to work toward a common goal. Social change
requires mass communication to help people understand the issues, organize themselves,
mobilize toward some kind of action, and affect social policy in one way or another. The change
may not always be toward a more democratic society. When the Shah of Iran was forced to flee
that country in January 1979, he was replaced by the Islamic fundamentalist cleric Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini, a religious leader whose ideas had been circulating in the country through the
“small media” of cassette tapes. His grassroots network of supporters was poised to support the
Shah’s overthrow, whose modernization policies upset many of the countries’ conservatives. For
the most part, however, a liberal media have facilitated liberal social changes.
The Internet, in particular, presents the most vexing challenge to countries with the most
restrictive media systems. “Authoritarian regimes can no longer maintain a monopoly over news
and censor what their people know,” writes Hachten (1999, p. 182). “They cannot stop news
from coming into their nation or from getting out. Shortwave radio, fax, Internet, telephones, and
Comsats have changed all that and blunted the power of censorship” (p. 182). This paper
engages in some informed speculation about how these technologies might affect parts of Asia in
the years ahead.
The next section will provide an overview of Asian mass media systems, followed by sections on
how some Asian governments are responding to the emergence of less controllable technologies
in this fast-changing world of digitization and globalization. The discussion of this paper is
predicated on three basic questions: 1) How would one characterize the current media
environment in Asia? 2) What critical incidents or developments have occurred that challenge
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existing media control structures? 3) Are there any trends or patterns that indicate changes in
the Asian mass media landscape?
.05 News and Information in Asia (return to index)
Of course the “Asian news media” as a monolithic entity does not exist. The mass media
systems of Asian countries such as China, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Vietnam and others
are different enough from each other in matters of organizational structure, philosophical
underpinnings, and state control to defy gross generalizations, although admittedly “Asia” itself is
sometimes perceived by non-Asians to be one big anomalous and amalgamated region. It would
also be misleading to refer to a “European” mass media system, but at least through the
mechanism of the European Union, and before that the European Community, there is slightly
more justification for characterizing European mass media monolithically. Countries within the EU
now have a shared history of trying to harmonize their audio-visual policy (such as the “The
Television without Frontiers Directive” of 1989 ), and the supranational structure of the EU does
have an impact on cross-national media and telecommunications policy and planning issues.
Asian countries have no comparable mechanism or desire for a unifying transnational media
policy.
Nevertheless, if one were to survey the Asian mass media system (and the news media in
particular), there are some similarities that are noteworthy. With exceptions such as Japan, the
Philippines, and Thailand, it would be safe to say that the majority of Asian mass media systems
in the East and Southeast Asia region is more rigidly controlled by government forces than their
Western counterparts. (The commercial mass media in the West have their own influences, of
course.) This control may be direct and apparent, as in the state-run media of North Korea,
China, and Laos, or indirect and subtle, such as the self-censorship practiced by “independent”
or “private” news media in countries where government authorities have made it clear through
words and action that those who criticize government leaders and official policies will be
punished. Control of the media can also be linked to cronyism — where publishers and editors
serve at the tacit discretion of political leaders. In such a milieu, the news media, though not
directly controlled by government, are supportive of their “friends” in government.
Even Japan’s news media model, which is arguably the most liberal and “Western” of all the
Asian nations due to a number of historical and cultural factors, lacks the antagonistic bite of an
aggressive watchdog press. This is in part due to the cozy relationship that develops between
journalists and power elites in the long-standing Japanese press clubs — where news is
gathered from government officials in a quasi-business, quasi-social environment — and in part
due to Japanese culture and tradition where a particular decorum is expected in matters of
human communication.
With the exceptions mentioned earlier, news organizations in much of East and Southeast Asia
do not operate on the free press model. Whether this is good, bad, necessary, unnecessary,
helpful, hurtful and so forth depends on who is doing the analysis. A review of the literature
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suggests that perspectives tend to fall into three broad categories:
1) Liberal Normative: A true democracy cannot exist without a free press, and it should be the
goal of every nation to aspire to a liberal media environment. Basic human rights are
intricately tied to freedom of speech, and when a nation represses this freedom it is not
democratic.
2) Cultural Relativist: The media system employed should reflect the needs and values of the
culture within which it exists. Concerns for social order and national security may require a
more controlled media environment, especially in times of national development or social
instability. Western democracy (and its obsession with freedom of speech) is not the ideal for
all countries at all times.
3) Delayed Progressive: A free press is the desired long­term outcome, but there are stages of
social and economic development that may precede that outcome. It is acceptable to have a
restrictive media system in the interim, and as a nation matures and stabilizes, those
restrictions will be eased. Democracy can exist and even be aided in a restrictive media
system.
Rather than argue over which one of these perspectives is the most universally sensible, it is
more appropriate at this stage to acknowledge that — right, wrong or somewhere in between —
these different perspectives exist and that a nation’s mass media system is the result of a
complex set of cultural, historical, political and other factors. One thing that can be learned from
the history of mass media in general is that media systems change as the society in which they
exist change, and media technology often plays an important role in social change.
Not many book-length publications about Asia’s mass media system have been written. The
task would probably strike most authors as being too daunting and complex. Two recent books
include William Atkin’s The Politics of Southeast Asia’s New Media (2002) and Drew
McDaniel’s Electronic Tigers of Southeast Asia: The Politics of Media, Technology, and National
Development (2002). As their titles imply, both of these books focus on Asian nations in the
southeast Asian region, but they cover a range of contemporary issues that would be informative
for those interested in a larger geographical area.
For a comprehensive treatment of 25 Asian mass media systems, the only book of its kind is
the Handbook of the Media in Asia (2000), which is 721 pages long and edited by Shelton A.
Gunaratne.
On a narrower but relevant topic, Mass Media and Cultural Identity: Ethnic Reporting in
Asia (1999) (edited by Anura Goonasekera and Youichi Ito) deals with issues related to media and
ethnic violence in Asia. William A. Hachten’s The World News Prism (1999) does not focus
specifically on Asia but covers press freedom issues in Asia as part of a larger discussion of
changes in media worldwide.
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Athough in need of an update, Jon Vanden Heuvel and Everette E. Dennis’The Unfolding Lotus:
East Asia’s Changing Media (1993) is still a good overview of the Asian media landscape. The
book provides succinct case studies of South Korea, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan,
Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand. The chapter on Hong Kong is one that
most obviously needs to be updated.
At the risk of overgeneralization, it is possible to do a meta-analysis of the literature about Asian
mass media systems — i.e., to analyze the analyses of these systems. For a more detailed
treatment, specific books (those mentioned above, for example) should be consulted. Also, there
are some country-specific books that are excellent. Ann Cooper-Chen’s Mass Communication in
Japan (1997) is an example of this. Other types of book on a single media system would be
Chin-Chuan Lee’s book called Voices of China: The Interplay of Politics and Journalism (1990),
which features 19 contributors contemplating a single topic, and U Thaung’s autobiographical
work – A Journalist, A General and An Army in Burma (1995) — about his days as a journalist
working under Burmese martial law.
It is perhaps unfair and centric to use the U.S. media system as a reference point for evaluating
Asian mass media systems. Admittedly, many factors need to be taken into consideration when
assessing any country’s mass media system (history, culture, political stability, and so forth).
What follows, then, is a continuum-based overview of mass media systems in Asia — an
assessment of the degree of “restrictiveness” of the media environment in a particular country
without a clear value judgment based on that assessment. It should be noted that no media
system in the world, regardless of the region, is completely free of controls or restrictions.
If a high level of “press control” is based on the amount of direct and indirect government
restrictions place on the news media in a country, and a low level of “press control” reflects a
relatively free press without much direct or indirect government control, there are certain
countries in Asia that can be said to have a low level of press control. Japan, the Philippines, and
Thailand, as mentioned earlier, have a relatively free press these days. It is true that Thailand did
issue an expulsion order against two foreign journalists in February 2002 for a Far Eastern
Economic Review story that referred to contentions between the Thai prime minister and royal
palace. But the amount of public criticism from within Thailand against the expulsion order was
evidence that the country still had a great deal of press freedom. The Thai news media were not
afraid to criticize the government’s expulsion order, whereas in a more restrictive media
environment, the press would likely have remained silent. (The foreign journalists’ visas were
eventually reinstated on appeal.) It is inappropriate in Thailand to criticize or speak ill of the royal
family, and the domestic media observe this cultural mandate.
At the other end of the continuum, where the level of press control is very high, are countries
with state- or military-controlled media systems such as China, North Korea, Burma, Laos, and
Vietnam. These countries have authoritarian governments that have different ideas from the U.S.
about the role that the news media should play in society. In tightly controlled media
environments, the mass media often serve as an apparatus of government. The adversarial,
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“watchdog” press is anathema in such a media system.
And in between these two extremes is an array of other countries that have varying levels of
press control. Hong Kong had been preparing for stricter press controls for years prior to its
reunification with China. Journalists there must walk a tightrope between maintaining a level of
independence and not offending the Chinese government. Some observers say that the Hong
Kong press is managing to strike that tricky balance but that has required a clear resort to self-
censorship.
In April 2002, Hong Kong’s top English newspaper The South China Morning Post fired its Beijing
bureau chief, which led to suspicions that press freedoms were being curbed. The bureau chief
had expressed his concerns earlier about having to tone down his reporting on subjects that
China found controversial. The editor of The South China Morning Post has publicly denied his
paper is kowtowing to Beijing. As of this writing, the future of the Hong Kong media environment
is far from clear, but it is unlikely to become more liberal. More likely, it will maintain some degree
of independence but, like some of its neighbors, also practice strategic self-censorship and
withhold or water down criticism of the Chinese government. News stories involving Tibet,
Taiwan, labor unrest and other controversial issues (in China’s view) will no doubt present
challenges to the Hong Kong media.
And yet there are anomalies to this presumption. Chinese government, which had blocked
Internet access to a number of Western news sites, suddenly and without warning allowed
access to them in mid-May 2002. Reuters, CNN, The Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times,
National Public Radio, and so on — all previously blocked — were unblocked. Then a few weeks
later, the Chinese government said it was punishing three of the country’s top web sites –
 sina.com, tom.com, and fm365.com – and admonishing others for undesirable content. The
announcement came at the start of a three-month campaign to tighten control over the Internet.
Coinciding with this act was the Chinese government’s order in June 2002 to shut down 2,400
Internet cafes for “safety inspections.” These cafes are supposed to be licensed, but only 200 of
them were. One article stated that, according to Chinese officials, “Internet cafes are polluting
the minds of children and teenagers with pornography and subversive material. Internet cafes are
required to install special software to track which sites users visit, and thousands have been
closed for failing to do so.” The government has a hotline to report web sites that are
“subversive.” In late June 2002, Microsoft announced that it was going to invest $750 million over
three years in China to help develop the country’s education, research, and hardware
manufacturing. Some see this as a precursor to Internet access liberalization; the Chinese
government, however, says that Microsoft will help strengthen information security. Hence the
situation in China and Hong Kong in regard to its digital media environment is really too
schizophrenic to call as of this writing.
Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia have a long history of being headed by strong — some would
say “authoritarian” — leaders who have had a clear distrust of foreign media and a stern
influence over domestic media. These nations are unlikely to greatly liberalize their media anytime
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soon because of a fear that too much press freedom could de-stabilize an always-tenuous socio-
political order. Singapore, in particular, has been in the news not only for it restrictive domestic
journalism climate but for its treatment of foreign media. Those who follow Singapore’s media
controversies are familiar with that country’s run-ins with domestic and foreign journalists. Lee
Kuan Yew, the country’s former prime minister and current senior minister or advisor, made no
bones about who was running the country when he was in power. A political leader with an
illustrious history leading his country from its uncertain days after national independence to a
miraculous economic success story, his clashes with the Asian Wall Street
Journal, Timemagazine’s Asian edition, the Far Eastern Economic Review and Asiaweekare
legendary. When once question about his country’s lack of press freedom, he calmly said, “You
are trying to impose a mold on me which my past does not enable me to fill up comfortably. And
I see no reason why I should.”
Lee takes the Cultural Relativist perspective in that he believes his country will not benefit from
the kind of Western democracy espoused by those who take the Liberal Normative perspective.
The Singaporean people also do not seem particularly opposed to their restrictive media system.
Lee is regarded by some as a “benevolent dictator,” someone who cares passionately about his
nation but rules through strict social discipline and a plethora of regulations. Yet, as he has
pointed out many times in the past, Singaporeans have “freedom.” Because they live in a society
with rules of conduct that are enforced and meant to engender social harmony and respect,
they have the freedom to walk out in the street late at night without fear of being victimized, and
they have the freedom to live in a clean and orderly environment. More than in some
industrialized nations, he argues, Singaporeans are “free.” When East meets West, sometimes
concepts such as these are difficult to wrap a definition around.
Many analysts believe that what mitigates authoritarianism in places like Singapore is a desire by
that country to be a serious player in the global economy and a place where international
businesses feel comfortable housing their Asian operations. Singapore, like Hong Kong, is
considered by many to be a good place for international business. To name but a few
advantages: People there speak English, the telecommunication infrastructure is advanced, the
economy is robust, the crime rate is negligible, and the political system is relatively honest. It can
be a comfortable place to roost for those accustomed to a relatively high standard of living. An
overly repressive political system would discourage foreign interests from looking so favorably
upon Singapore.
At the same time, the government has closely managed the country’s development, including its
media system. Lee Kuan Yew has been called a dictator; he counters by saying that the media
in the West have controls on it as well from wealthy commercial interests that stifle media
content. In an interview with the Japanese national public broadcaster NHK, Lee responds to
criticism about his treatment of foreign journalists:
[W]e have not stopped the foreign press. What we have done — and this is also for our own
press — is that if you publish something which is not accurate or something which is slanted
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against the Singapore Government and you sell your paper or program in Singapore, we
demand the right of reply. You must allow us a reply in the same prominent way. Now, they
refused. So, we said, “Then, you can’t sell.” So, they agreed. Now that we have the right of
reply, their misreporting, their slant in the stories have diminished because they know that
we can reply in their columns and they will not appear so good. Is that muzzling the press? I
don’t think so. They can say what they want. We must have the right to defend ourselves. I
think that’s fair. We have not banned them.
Of course there are those who would disagree with Lee’s rationalization, but his views about the
news media have been remarkably consistent during his long tenure as prime minister and senior
minister.
In other parts of Asia, the media may be in transition. Despite the financial crisis of 1997, many
developing Asian countries are responding to the challenges of modernization and globalization in
their own ways. Some of these responses will require a re-thinking of their media systems,
especially in the Digital Age. The impact of the Internet, satellites, advanced telephone systems,
international news services, and so forth will no doubt affect Asia’s overall media environment.
Other factors that also have to be considered when examining a country’s media system are
changes in society related to a country’s economic development and increased international
relations; the growth of a literate and consumptive middle class; the social activism of university
students and others poised to fight for social reforms; the ingenuity of expatriates to circumvent
local restrictions; and the “changing guard” in a country’s political establishment. All of these
factors and more need to be taken into consideration when speculating about how media
systems in Asia may change in the years ahead.
In the next section, two Southeast Asian countries will be analyzed and discussed in terms of
their response to the Internet. Singapore and Vietnam were chosen because they are different
and similar at the same time. They are both in the same sub-region — Southeast Asia — and
they both have high levels of press control. But their political systems, history, culture and state
of technological advancement are very different. Yet, one could argue that if Vietnam’s media
environment were to liberalize in response to its modernization and urbanization aims, it would
liberalize more to a Singaporean model than, say, a more liberal model in Asia like Japan, the
Philippines, or Thailand. Singapore has presented itself as an interesting case study because it is
a country that has modernized on its own terms — participating in the global capitalist system
without yielding to foreign pressures to liberalize its media system.
.06 Critical Incidents that Challenge Existing Media Control Structures(return to index)
The number of Internet Service Providers in a country is not an accurate reflection of that
country’s control over its digital news and information environment, but it does provide some
insight into how many entities exist in a country that can facilitate Internet access for individuals,
families, businesses and so forth.
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Here is a list of selected Asian countries, their populations, and the number of ISPs in the country
presented here for comparison and discussion. The U.K. and U.S. are listed at the end of the list
for comparison with two Western nations :
* China, population: 1.27 billion, 3 ISPs (2000)
* Hong Kong, population: 7.2 million, 17 ISPs (2000)
* Indonesia, population: 229 million, 24 ISPs (2000)
* Japan, population: 127 million, 73 ISPs (2000)
* Malaysia, population: 22 million, 7 ISPs (2000)
* Philippines, population: 83 million, 33 ISPs (2000)
* Singapore, population: 4.3 million, 9 ISPs (2000)
* South Korea, population: 48 million, 11 ISPs (2000)
* Taiwan, population: 22.4 million, 8 ISPs (2000)
* Thailand, population: 62 million, 15 ISPs (2000)
* Vietnam, population: 80 million, 5 ISPs (2000)
* United Kingdom: 60 million, 245 ISPs (2000)
* United States, population: 279 million, 7,800 ISPs (2000)
Some interesting but not too surprising figures appear above. First, the number of ISPs in China
vis-à-vis its population is remarkably few. This is not surprising given that the fewer the number of
ISPs in a country, the easier it is to control Internet access. Thailand, a country with a fairly open
and liberal media system, has a smaller population than Vietnam, but three times the ISPs. (Of
course, GDPs and relative state of economic and technological development should also be
taken into consideration for a more comprehensive analysis.) The U.S. and U.K. have
considerably higher numbers of ISPs, a situation that reflects their relatively hands-off approach to
Internet communication and advanced state of economic and technological development. It is
much easier to control three ISPs than 7,800.
Since Singapore and Vietnam will be used for a comparative analysis, some basic data about
each country is helpful:
SINGAPORE VIETNAM
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(2000) (2000)
POPULATION 4,300,419 79,939,014
AREA 637.5 sq km 329,560 sq km
LITERACY 93.5% 93.7%
GDP $26,500 $1,950
INTERNET USERS 1.7 million 121,000
TELEPHONE LINES 1.9 million 2.6 million
GOVT. TYPE Communist Parliamentary Republic
POVERTY N/A 37% (1998 est.)
The population and landmass of Vietnam is vastly larger than Singapore, although their rates of
literacy (the percentage of people 15 years and older who can read and write) are comparable.
Singapore is a rich country if GDP is an indicator — in fact, it is considered one of the richest in
the world. Vietnam, by comparison, is a relative poor country when GDP is used as a measure.
There are significantly fewer Internet users in Vietnam, which should be viewed not only in
absolute numbers but in relation to the overall population numbers for both countries. In
Singapore, nearly 40% of the population were Internet users in 2000, compared to about 3% of
the Vietnamese population.
Vietnam has a Communist government, and Singapore a Parliamentary Republic. There are
negligible levels of poverty in Singapore, whereas in Vietnam those who live below the poverty
level number about 37% of the population.
This is just a thumbnail sketch of each country’s characteristics. Books mentioned in the
Bibliography as well as reliable web sites on various countries of interest are good places to get
more detailed and comprehensive information.
SINGAPORE (return to index)
On August 28, 1996, the U.S.-based Electronic Frontier Foundation issued the following press
release . This was a time in history when the Internet was becoming a popular medium, largely
because of the widespread use of graphical user interfaces that made navigating the Internet
user-friendly. Technological advances also made the Internet more appealing to people who
were not computer specialists or technologically savvy. This press release provides a good
overview of what the Singaporean government’s policy approach to monitoring the Internet was
going to be in the years ahead:
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The government of Singapore recently established strict controls on all Internet Service
Providers and many World Wide Web pages. ISPs and content providers will be licensed, and
required to adhere to a rigid set of content guidelines which apply to political speech, ethnic
and religious remarks including satire, and public morals including “contents which
propagate permissiveness or promiscuity.”
We believe that the licensing policy and broad content guidelines will effectively chill the free
flow of information not only in Singapore, but worldwide. Because the Internet is global,
transcending geographical bounds, we are convinced that censorship within any nation or
state, whether implicit or explicit, poses a threat to all users of the global network. We
therefore encourage the government of Singapore, and other governments implementing or
considering policies of content control, to stress education rather than regulation.
Singapore’s approach, like the Communications Decency Act that was passed but quickly
rescinded in the U.S., applies a broadcast regulatory standard to the Internet.
The application of broadcast­inspired, “one­to­many” regulation to this new *many­to­
many* medium indicates a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the Internet.
Unlike television and radio broadcasting, the Internet does not push material at the viewer,
but simply makes material available on demand – not unlike a rapid inter­library loan. And
unlike broadcasting, the Internet does not present the views of a limited few privileged
speakers, but allows all participants to publish, comment on, and even refute, what they
read.
Recognizing that every culture has its own standards regarding what is or is not
appropriate, the undersigned organizations recommend that Singapore’s government allow
its citizens to use Internet filtering tools, with which they can block out any material that is
offensive to them, rather than embark upon a closed­border approach that will cut Singapore
off from the new global online library.
Support of individually customizable filtration services, instead of a broad top­down
censorship effort, would enable Singapore to participate in a more positive and effective way
in the evolution of this new open medium, and would indicate trust in the ability of
Singaporeans to choose what is right for Singapore and for themselves.
This was an interesting campaign because it depicted another side of “globalization.” In
economic terms, globalization suggests the interconnection and liberalization of markets all over
the world. In information terms, globalization suggests an interconnection of information
opportunities, and when there is a weakness (i.e., government-imposed censorship) in one part
of the network, the whole network suffers because of it, according to the EFF’s rationale. There
is an imperfect analogy that can be drawn between this situation and the advocacy argument for
global trade. Those who support it want as many countries to be connected to the global trade
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network — indeed, the more the better — but that also means these countries have to buy into
an ideological premise underlying global trade and organizations such as the World Trade
Organization. While the EFF may or may not support a global trade system, its argument as
stated in the press release does assume a universal ideology of press freedom.
Singapore has never been shy about regulating its traditional mass media, so it is not surprising
that it took a seemingly novel and clever approach to regulating the Internet. It RETROACTIVELY
licensed ISPs, political parties that maintain web sites, groups and individuals who run discussion
sites on politics and religion, and online newspapers. As licensed “broadcasters,” they fell under
the authority of the Singapore Broadcasting Authority (SBA). One of the SBA’s first actions in July
1996 was to remove — or rather, have removed — an Internet newsgroup posting that it felt
was objectionable. According to one news article from 1996: “About 10 SBA officials will surf the
net daily for objectionable material. A government-appointed panel of prominent citizens will
decide what is objectionable… ”
One example of objectionable material would be anti-government statements or, in the SBA’s
words, content that “tend(s) to bring the government into hatred or contempt, or which excite
disaffection against the government.” Other prohibited content (which was already banned from
the traditional mass media in Singapore) included:
1) content that jeopardizes public security or national defense;
2) anything that ridicules racial or religious groups;
3) the promotion of religious deviations or occult practices;
4) the “gross exploitation” of violence, nudity, sex or horror;
5) the depiction of “sexual perversions” such as homosexuality.
One interesting case that tested this restrictive media environment involved a web site called
Sintercom, founded by Tan Chong Kee. The site existed for years and offered “alternative views”
on politics, including criticism of the Singaporean government. However, in August 2001, the
founder, a Singaporean resident, decided to shut the site down. The SBA was asking him to
register the site as a political web site. It would then have to abide by SBA guidelines or risk
being fined. The site was enormously popular, attracting about 7,000 visitors per day, but to
continue it would have been risky since, under SBA guidelines, content could not be against the
public interest, public order or national harmony. The founder was deterred, or so it seemed.
Less than a year later, however, Sintercom was back, this time with an anonymous editor, and
now called New Sintercom. The nom de plume being used by the editor (or editors, as the case
may be) is “Mr. Kee Luan Few,” a play on the former prime minister Lee Kuan Yew. The New
Sintercom editor has vowed not to register as a political web site. Other sources of news and
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information — in particular two newsgroups, SG-Daily and Singapore Forum — also appeared.
The original founder of Sintercom commented in the Strait Times: “The result of SBA’s policy of
going after sites like Sintercom is not the conversion of such sites into ineffectual self-censoring
ones, but that such sites will become anonymous and be hosted overseas.”
Although Singapore has measures in place to crack down on what it considers to be undesirable
content, there are myriad ways that dissidents can circumvent restrictions. Newsgroups and
web sites can be created and shut down, but unlike newspapers and television stations, it is
relatively easy to start up a new newsgroup and web site. If problems occur with local hosting
(because the ISP is closely monitored by government authorities), newsgroups and web sites can
be created overseas where the media environment is less restrictive (e.g., Australia, the U.S.,
the U.K.). Also, the Internet allows for anonymity and circuitous communication. People who
wanted to criticize the government and even break sedition laws could do so with little chance of
being caught if they are careful.
Interestingly, the case in Singapore is reminiscent of sixteenth century England. Singapore
requires ISPs and content providers to be licensed. Political web sites must be registered. There
is an index of forbidden content. Censors closely monitor content production and information
traffic. Sanctions are imposed for rule violations. And as such, a culture of self- censorship
develops to guard against offending authorities. However, there are also those who push the
envelope and break or circumvent the rules at some risk to their security and pocketbooks. The
difference is that it is much easier to break the rules with the Internet because of its anonymous
and circuitous nature, making it difficult to track down and sanction offenders, or to keep people
silent for very long before they re-emerge as a different web site or newsgroup. The ability to
publish websites remotely is somewhat comparable to printing books in the sixteenth century in
neighboring countries where printing laws were more lax, and then importing the books to be
sold in countries where they were not being printed. The point is, regulating Internet content is
not easy as long as people are willing and able to try and outsmart the regulators. It is well
known that “Internet culture” is full of digital rogues, hackers, and rule-breakers. They exist in
Asia as well, where the level of technological knowledge, especially among the educated youth,
is rather high in many countries. These rebels are pushing the regulatory envelope.
VIETNAM (return to index)
Vietnam is considered to have one of the most restrictive media environments in Asia. A report
by Reporters Sans Frontieres included Vietnam on a list with other countries one normally thinks
of as being some of the most repressive in the world. These countries are said to totally or mostly
control Internet access. Sharing this dubious limelight with Vietnam were Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Burma, China, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, North Korea, Saudi Arabia,
Sierra Leone, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
Vietnam has been dealing with the Internet in similar ways to Singapore. In June 1996, the
government of Vietnam required all Internet Service Providers to register with the government
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and prohibit “data that can affect national security, social order, and safety or information that is
not appropriate to the culture, morality, and traditional customs of the Vietnamese people.” The
government would determine what kind of information would fit under these categories.
Singapore’s regulation had to catch up with the technology. Already a technologically advanced
society, the Singaporean government (like many others in the world) had to create rules and
regulations governing the Internet after they realized what a digital dragon had been released
onto the global computer system. In Vietnam’s case, perhaps learning from its neighbors, it laid
down the rules before the country even had a connection to the Internet. Like other developing
countries in Asia, however, it was caught between wanting to develop its telecommunications
infrastructure to facilitate its modernization and urbanization aims and wanting to maintain a level
of control over news and information flow. Because of the country’s tumultuous political history,
there are a lot of people outside of Vietnam (including Vietnamese refugees living in non-
Communist countries) who would like to see Vietnam converted to a democratic state. They
have set up websites expressing their views, and the Vietnamese government considers these
ideas to be dangerous and corrosive. The government has tried its best to censor these sites
and other Internet content through a strict regulatory framework that includes licensing,
registration, and surveillance of assorted Internet-related activities.
This tight control over the Internet is accompanied by a loosening of control over its centralized
economy. Not wanting to be left behind as other parts of East Asia and Southeast Asia link to a
growing global economy, the Vietnamese government adopted a policy of “doi moi” (newness
and change) in 1987 that set into motion a national initiative for economic reform. A move toward
a market economy within a socialist framework (sometimes referred to as “market socialism”) is
part of the “doi moi” program, but change is to come gradually to preserve political and social
stability and not raise the ire of orthodox politicians resistant to change. Currently, the
development of Vietnam’s telecommunications infrastructure is an important part of its overall
transition toward modernization, and systematic urban planning is occurring to conceive and
construct livable cities.
Vietnam was a relative latecomer to the world of global Internet connectivity, and it proceeded
with extreme caution and vigilance. It was only in November 1997 that the country decided to
allow comprehensive access to the Internet, although e-mail services had been available before
then. In a country of 80 million people, only approximately 12,000 had access to the Internet
when it was first launched. Part of this was due to the newness of the technology and need to
develop a better telecommunications infrastructure, but another part was a serious desire to
control and mitigate the unanticipated effects of having too much free news and information flow.
The Internet is like an open door to the rest of the world in which information content can get out
as well as get in. As Vietnam continued to pursue its development goals, it did not want to deal
with the subversive elements that might be generated through electronic communication
channels.
Vietnam has worked with both Singapore and the U.S. to improve its data communications,
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allowing it better capacity to transmit information internationally through wired and wireless
channels. South Korea’s KT Corp has helped introduce ADSL technology to Vietnam, which will
vastly improve the speed of Internet connectivity. As the country pursues its goals of economic
development and urbanization, the robustness of its telecommunications network will be a key
concern. The Vietnamese government is pursuing relationships with foreign companies to help it
meet its development goals. Conversely, companies outside Vietnam are looking to the country
for the potential outsourcing of services there as is already happening in parts of Asia. In July
2000, a historical event occurred when the U.S. and Vietnam signed a trade agreement that
would pave the way for a more open trade relationship between the two countries. This came
approximately six years after President Clinton lifted the trade embargo on Vietnam. The question
is: As Vietnam develops its network capacity to allow for business relationships with foreign
companies and governments, will it still be able to maintain a restrictive media environment and
control over its civilian digital communications?
If one takes the case of Singapore, the answer is a tentative yes. But the next question remains:
For how long? One writer suggests that it does not really matter whether the ordinary
Vietnamese citizen gets access to foreign news and ideas designed to persuade them to think
more along the lines of dissidents. “During the Vietnam War,” writes Keith B. Richburg, “Hanoi’s
Communist leaders constantly warned people not to listen to shortwave radio broadcasts of
Voice of America, the BBC and other foreign outlets considered subversive and potentially
injurious to the war effort. Of course, Vietnamese did listen — and the North won the war
anyway. ” It is possible that official news may be more credible to people, regardless of what
other views are out there.
In June 1996, however, the Vietnamese government was not about to take any chances. In
response to concerns in the Communist Party that anti-communist or anti-government content
on the Internet could undermine political stability, the country’s telecommunications authority —
Directorate General of Posts and Telecommunications (DGPT) made it clear it had full jurisdiction
to control the Internet. All Internet users would have to register with the DGPT and Internet
Service Providers would have to submit documents to the government explaining their systems
so that the government would have an easier time regulating content. At the same time that this
was occurring, organizations were already setting up web sites that would post uncensored and
critical materials about Vietnam.
In June 2002, the Vietnamese Embassy in the U.S. featured an article on its website publicizing
the favorable credit rating Vietnam received from a U.S.-based credit rating agency. The upgrade
(from stable to positive) was in part due to the country’s “renewed commitment to economic
reforms” and “the ratification of its bilatral trade agreement with the U.S., as well as the
implementation of its structural reform programmes supported by the World Bank (WB) and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF).” An article released on the same day, however, showed that
while Vietnam was making headway in developing a market economy, it was still a country
rooted in Communist traditions. The article described the role of the Vietnamese press as helping
with national construction and development: “In its capacity as the vanguard force in the cultural
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and ideological front, the press has played an active role in discovering and encouraging cases of
effective economic operation. It has also helped in the fight against corruption, negative
phenomena, and social evils to purify the Party and administrative contingent.” In effect,
modernization in Vietnam does not necessarily mean Westernization. Like Singapore, Vietnam is
trying to develop and reform on its own terms and in its own way.
.07 The Future Mass Media Landscape in Asia (return to index)
It is by no means clear what the mass media landscape in Asia will look like in the future. Very
possibly it will be, as it is now, a mosaic of different media environments with varying degrees of
press freedom and approaches to regulating the Internet. On one end of the so-called free press
continuum, there will be Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand demonstrating the most tolerance
for an open and unfettered media environment. On the other end of the spectrum will be
countries such as China, Singapore and Vietnam. These countries have already shown a
predilection for extending the strict media controls they have over traditional mass media into the
digital media world. Even as Vietnam moves toward a more open market economy, it wants to
maintain tight control over the production and dissemination of news and information.
On the other hand, another alternative is that as economic globalization continues to grow and
affect the national policies of those countries that choose to be linked into such a system, a
corresponding “information globalization” will occur that will encourage some harmonization of
international information policies, perhaps starting with the need for reliable economic news to
cross over national borders. If Vietnam is to fashion itself after Singapore, Hong Kong or other
Asian Tigers, it will likely find many foreigners living within its borders. Providing for the information
needs of these sojourners may require a liberalization of existing mass media controls. Moreover,
a growing number of Vietnamese university students are studying abroad and returning to their
home country after exposure to different ideas about press control. This, in itself, is no harbinger
of press freedom – after all, Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew studied law at Cambridge in England –
but it does suggest that Vietnam’s next generation of leaders may have ideological influences
that are different from the current generation.
In the case of Singapore, there seems to be some recognition that while it is important to
regulate the Internet, it is going to be difficult to do absolutely. Singapore has drawn the lines of
acceptable reportage within its own borders for both domestic and foreign journalists, and it has
maintained a hard-line stand against what it considers to be subversive reporting practices. At
the same time, its society has prospered and flourished without complete press freedoms.
Striking this balance has been tricky, but it seems, for the most part, to have allowed it to be
restrictive in one sense but commercially robust in another.
Can Vietnam follow in that same vein? Comparisons between the two nations may or may not
be useful, even as Vietnam continues a program of greater international relations and economic
development. It is, after all, a Communist state, and its development goals are not necessarily
closely aligned with Singapore’s. However, if Vietnam were to succeed joining the other “Asian
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Tigers” at some point, its media system is more likely to resemble the Singaporean model than,
say, one of the more liberal systems mentioned above (i.e., Japan, the Philippines, or Thailand).
Hence it has been instructive to examine both nations in juxtaposition. What Vietnam has learned
from Singapore is that it is possible to adopt some elements of Western modernization while
rejecting others. As its economy continues to grow, its middle class continues to expand, its
telecommunications infrastructure continues to advance, and its youth become more educated
and exposed to Western ideas and values, it is hard to say what changes will occur in that
society. Already there are concerns that there are too many Western influences there — from
Coca-Cola ads to Nike shoes. Now that their appetites have been whet, will the younger
generations want more changes than their government leaders are prepared to deliver?
Whatever the outcome, at some point Asia’s more authoritarian governments may find that for all
their good intentions in regulating their old and new media technologies, the age of digital media
systems — particularly the Internet and satellites — will usher in a period where regulation proves
as difficult and frustrating as trying to regulate the technology of printing in a society hungry for
knowledge and communication. Is a free press a culturally-biased value that can do more harm
than good for some countries in Asia that are struggling to find their footing in a Western-
dominated global political and economic system, or is it a universal right that all people and
governments should embrace once they are “enlightened”? These are not idle ponderings. The
deliberations that lead to their answers have the power to define the future.
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Pre-publication censorship. This typically involved having to submit a manuscript for approval by
church or government authorities.
Scholars in the past have written about the different roles that journalists play in various societies.
One of the best-known analyses in mass communications circles is Frederick S. Siebert’s Four
Theories of the Press, which is also published in a book (1956) by the same name. Siebert
classified media systems into four categories: authoritarian, libertarian, Soviet, and social
responsibility. Others have modified and updated his categories. One point that Siebert and his
colleagues were trying to make was that the mass media system serves different purposes in
different countries, largely depending on the dominant political system governing that country. In
reality, Siebert’s categories are not absolutely exclusive of each other. Media systems may
exhibit characteristics from two or more of his categories. As such, his categorization scheme
should be viewed as a broad but useful generality.
The countries that constitute Asia can be a matter of contention. Distinctions such as East Asia,
South Asia, Southeast Asia, and North Asia help focus attention on geographical regions. The
mass media systems discussed in this paper will come mainly from East and Southeast Asia.
This controversial directive put a quota on the amount of “foreign” programs that could be
broadcast in the EC. Largely believed to be an attempt to curb the influx of American television
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shows in the EC, this directive created international tensions between policy makers in the EC
and trade officials and entertainment industry executives in the U.S.
Japan’s media law and policy resembles the U.S. model by design. As part of the democratic
reforms imposed by U.S. Occupation Forces in Japan after World War II, language pertaining to
freedom of the press, at least in concept, was included in the Japanese Constitution.
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Technically it is called the Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People’s Republic of China,
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Archival material from this period can be found on the Electronic Frontier Foundation web
site, http://www.eff.org. Search for Singapore.
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Noel Karaffa
on January 31, 2014 at 11:48 AM said:
This Blog is a total waste of time!
work from home billing and coding jobs
on February 3, 2014 at 1:03 PM said:
Thank you for the auspicious writeup. It in fact was
a amusement account it. Look advanced to more added
agreeable from you! By the way, how could we communicate?
Julianne
on February 3, 2014 at 10:09 PM said:
Heya i am for the primary time here. I came across this board and I in finding It
truly useful & it helped me out much. I hope to present something back and help others
like
you aided me.
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Kari
on February 4, 2014 at 11:23 AM said:
Can I simply say what a comfort to find somebody who really knows what
they’re discussing on the internet. You certainly understand how to bring an issue to light
and make it important.
More and more people really need to look at this and understand this side of your story.
I was surprised you are not more popular because you surely have the
gift.
Alyce
on February 4, 2014 at 6:57 PM said:
It’s actually a great and useful piece of info. I am happy that you simply
shared this useful info with us. Please keep us up to date like this.
Thank you for sharing.
Lesli
on February 5, 2014 at 1:36 AM said:
Aw, this was a really nice post. Taking the time and actual effort to
make a really good article… but what can I say… I put things off a whole lot and never
seem to get anything done.
Marta
on February 5, 2014 at 4:27 AM said:
The other day, while I was at work, my cousin stole my
iPad and tested to see if it can survive a 40 foot
drop, just so she can be a youtube sensation. My apple ipad is now broken and she has
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83 views.
I know this is completely off topic but I had to share it
with someone!
Margarito
on February 6, 2014 at 1:47 AM said:
Every weekend i used to go to see this web site, as i wish for enjoyment, as this this
website conations
actually good funny stuff too.
